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Extensive Infinite Games and Escalation,
an exercice in Agda
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University of Lyon, E´cole normale supe´rieure de Lyon, CNRS (LIP),
46 alle´e d’Italie, 69364 Lyon, France
Escalation in games is when agents keep playing forever. Based on formal proofs we claim
that if agents assume that resource are infinite, escalation is rational.
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1 Introduction
Escalation in games is the phenomenon where agents keep playing (or betting if the game
consists in bets) forever, leading to their ruin. Since Shubik[12] people claim that such an
attitude is not rational. Based on formal proofs we are able to refute such a claim and to
say that if agents assume that resource are infinite, escalation is rational. Since our first
work[4] which took place before the 2008 financial crisis, evidence[1] show that stating
the rationality of escalation makes sense. The only solution for avoiding escalation is then
to assume that resource are finite.
In previous works[6,5] we used an approach based on Coq[2] and coinduction (a dual
of induction aimed at reasoning on infinite data structures[3]). Especially in[7] we used
dependent types together with coinduction. In this paper, we use coinduction in Agda[9],
because it allows a terse style closed to this of mathematicians. Agda is a formal proof
computer environment as well as a dependently typed programming language.
Notice other works using proof assistants for proving properties of agents. For instance,
Ste´phane Le Roux proved the existence of Nash equilibria using Coq and Isabelle[10,11].
In a somewhat connected area, Tobias Nipkow proved Arrows theorem in HOL[8]. Agda
code of this development are available on GitHub 1.
2 Games and Strategy Profiles
Since we study game theory, lest us first define games. A game is either a leaf or a node.
A leaf is a assignment to each agent of a Utility (sometime called a payoff ). Note that
the type of utility depends on the agent (dependent type). A node contains two entities,
put in a record: an agent (the agent who has the trait) and a function next which tells
the next positions to be played.
1 https://github.com/PierreLescanne/DependentTypesForExtensiveGames-in-Agda
mutual
Game = ((a : Agent) → Utility a) ⊎ NodeG
record NodeG : Set where
coinductive
field
ag : Agent
next : Choice → Game
Notice the key word coinductive which shows that we deal with infinite games. The main
concept in game theory is this of strategy profiles. Strategy profiles are like games with at
each node a choice, which is the choice of the agent who continues the game. In Agda the
sum comes with to unctions inj1 and inj2. In our case, if u is a utility assignment of type
((a : Agent) → Utility a) then inj1 u is a Game and n is a NodeG then inj2 n is a Game.
Strategy profiles are abbreviated StratProf.
mutual
StratProf = ((a : Agent) → Utility a) ⊎ NodeS
record NodeS : Set where
coinductive
field
ag : Agent
next : Choice → StratProf
ch : Choice
We can define the underlying game of a strategy profile
game : (s : StratProf) → Game
game (inj1 u) = inj1 u
game (inj2 n) = inj2 (gameN n) where
gameN : NodeS → NodeG
NodeG.ag (gameN n) = ag n
NodeG.next (gameN n) c = game (next n c)
The underlying game of a leaf (strategy profile) is the same utility assignment, i.e., a leaf
(game). For nodes, games are attributed corecursively. Now let us look at another concept.
Given two strategy profiles, one may wonder whether they have the same underlying game.
This is given by the binary relation ≈sg .
mutual
data _≈sg_ : StratProf → StratProf → Set where
≈sgLeaf : u : (a : Agent) → Utility a → inj1 u ≈
sg inj1 u
≈sgNode : n n’ : NodeS → n ◦≈sg n’ → inj2 n ≈
sg inj2 n’
record _◦≈sg_ (n n’ : NodeS) : Set where
coinductive
field
is◦≈sg : ag n ≡ ag n’ → ((c : Choice) → next n c ≈sg next n’ c)
A leaf has the same game as itself, two nodes have the same game if all their “next”
strategy profiles have the same games. Notice that we use the symbol ◦ for concepts
associated with NodeS, when the concept without ◦ is associated with StratProf. Given a
strategy profile, we may want to compute the utility of an agent. This assumes that the
path that follows the choices of the agents leads to a leaf. A strategy profile s with such
a property is said convergent, written ↓ s. This is defined as follows:
mutual
data ↓ : StratProf → Set where
↓Leaf : u : (a : Agent) → Utility a → ↓ (inj1 u)
↓Node : n : NodeS → ◦↓ n → ↓ (inj2 n)
record ◦↓ (n : NodeS) : Set where
inductive
field
is◦↓ : ↓ (next n (ch n))
Notice that not all the strategy profile are convergent, for instance the strategy profile
AcBc of Section 4 is not convergent.
We define the utility assignment '&%$ !"#u of a convergent strategy profile. '&%$ !"#u takes two
parameters: a strategy profile s and a proof that s is convergent.
'&%$ !"#u : (s : StratProf) → (↓ s) → (a : Agent) → Utility a
'&%$ !"#u (inj1 u) ↓Leaf = u'&%$ !"#u (inj2 n) (↓Node p) = ◦ '&%$ !"#u n p
◦ '&%$ !"#u : (n : NodeS) → (◦↓ n) → (a : Agent) → Utility a
◦ '&%$ !"#u n p = '&%$ !"#u (next n (ch n)) (is◦↓ p)
Subgame perfect equilibria are very interesting strategy profiles. They are strategy pro-
files in which the choices of the agents are the best. A leaf is always a subgame perfect
equilibrium. A node is a subgame perfect equilibrium if the next strategy profile for the
choice of the agent is convergent and is a subgame perfect equilibrium, if for any other
node which has the same game and whose next strategy profile is also convergent and is
a subgame perfect equilibrium, the utility of the agent of the given node is not less than
the utility of the agent of this other node. This is defined formally in Agda as follows,
where we use ⇋ s to tell that s is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
data ⇋_ : StratProf → Set where
⇋Leaf : u : (a : Agent) → Utility a → ⇋ inj1 u
⇋Node : n n’ : NodeS →
n ◦≈sg n’ →
⇋ (next n (ch n)) →
⇋ (next n’ (ch n’)) →
(p : ↓ (next n (ch n))) → (p’ : ↓ (next n’ (ch n’))) →
( '&%$ !"#u (next n (ch n)) p (ag n)) ≮ ( '&%$ !"#u (next n’ (ch n’)) p’ (ag n)) →
⇋ inj2 n
3 Escalation
We are now interested in strategy profile leading to escalation.
3.1 Good strategy profile
A first property toward escalation is what we call goodness. A strategy profile is good if
at each node, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium with the same game and the same
choice.
mutual
data ,_ : (s : StratProf) → Set where
,Node : n : NodeS → ◦, n → , (inj2 n)
record ◦,_ (n : NodeS) : Set where
coinductive
field
is◦, : (n’ : NodeS) → ⇋ (inj2 n’) → n ◦≈
sg n’ → ch n ≡ ch n’ →
, (next n (ch n))
In other words, this strategy profile is not itself a subgame perfect equilibrium, in partic-
ular, it can be non convergent, but each of its choices is dictated by a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Goodness can be considered as rationality in the choices of the agents. Reader
may notice that goodness is of interest only in infinite games, because in a finite game,
there is no difference between a good strategy and a subgame perfect equilibrium.
3.2 Divergent strategy profile
Another property of strategy profiles is divergence. In a divergent strategy profile, if one
follows the choices of the agents, one never gets to a leaf, but, on the opposite, one
runs forever. A divergent strategy profile is written ↑ s. The formal definition in Agda
of divergence looks like this of convergence, but the test for divergence is based on a
coinductive record and never hits a leaf, therefore there is no ↑Leaf case.
mutual
data ↑_ : StratProf → Set where
↑Node : n : NodeS → ◦↑ n → ↑ (inj2 n)
record ◦↑ (n : NodeS) : Set where
coinductive
field
is◦↑ : ↑ (next n (ch n))
An escalation is a strategy profile which is both good and divergent.
4 Strategies with two agents and two choices
To build escalating strategy profiles, we consider the case of two agents Alice and Bob
and two choices down and right.
data AliceBob : Set where
Alice Bob : AliceBob
data DorR : Set where
down right : DorR
We take the natural numbers N as utility 2 for both agents 3 and for the ≮ relation we
take the < relation defined as:
data _<_ : N → N → Set where
z<z : zero < zero
s<z : n : N → suc n < zero
s<s : n m : N → n < m → suc n < suc m
A utility assignment is for instance this which assigns 1 to Alice and 0 to Bob:
uA1B0 : AliceBob → N
uA1B0 Alice = 1
uA1B0 Bob = 0
from which we can build a leaf strategy profile:
A1B0 : StratProf
A1B0 = inj1 uA1B0
which is convergent.
↓A1B0 : ↓ A1B0
↓A1B0 = ↓Leaf
From the utility assignment which assigns 0 to Alice and 1 to Bob on can build the
convergent strategy profile A0B1.
Moreover, we build an infinite strategy AcBs, in which Alice continues always and Bob
stops always:
2 We could have taken a utility with only two values, but we feel that the reader is more
acquainted with natural numbers for utilities.
3 In this case, the type of utility does not depend on the agent.
mutual
AcBs : StratProf
AcBs = inj2 ◦AcBs
◦AcBs : NodeS
ag ◦AcBs = Alice
ch ◦AcBs = right
next ◦AcBs down = A0B1
next ◦AcBs right = BsAc
BsAc : StratProf
BsAc = inj2 ◦BsAc
◦BsAc : NodeS
ag ◦BsAc = Bob
ch ◦BsAc = down
next ◦BsAc down = A1B0
next ◦BsAc right = AcBs
We notices that by mutual co-recursion, AcBs is defined together with an infinite strategy
profile BsAc which starts with a node of which Bob is the agent. Those strategies are like
infinite combs.
?>=<89:;
A
r
&.
d
		
?>=<89:;
B
r
**
d

?>=<89:;
A
r
&.
d
		
?>=<89:;
B
r
**
d

?>=<89:;
A
r
&.
d
		
?>=<89:;
B
r
**
d

?>=<89:;
A
r
&.
d
		
?>=<89:;
B
r
**
d

?>=<89:;
A
r
"*
d
		
r
$$
0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1
With down one reaches always a leaf and with right one goes always to a new strategy
profile, which is a node. There is a variant of the node ◦AcBs, in which the first choice of
Alice is down instead of right.
Var◦AcBs : NodeS
ag Var◦AcBs = Alice
ch Var◦AcBs = down
next Var◦AcBs down = A0B1
next Var◦AcBs right = BsAc
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We prove that ◦AcBs and Var◦AcBs have the same game. Likewise we prove that AcBs is
convergent i.e., ↓ AcBs. Those two facts are key steps in the proof that AcBs is subgame
prefect equilibrium i.e., that ⇋ AcBs.
On the same paradigm we built a strategy profile AsBc in which A stops and B
continues and which is proved to be convergent and to be a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We also build a strategy profile in which A and B both continue.
mutual
AcBc : StratProf
AcBc = inj2 ◦AcBc
◦AcBc : NodeS
ag ◦AcBc = Alice
ch ◦AcBc = right
next ◦AcBc down = A0B1
next ◦AcBc right = BcAc
BcAc : StratProf
BcAc = inj2 ◦BcAc
◦BcAc : NodeS
ag ◦BcAc = Bob
ch ◦BcAc = right
next ◦BcAc down = A1B0
next ◦BcAc right = AcBc
AcBs, AcBc and AsBc have the same game. Unlike AcBs and AsBc, the strategy profile
AcBc is divergent, i.e., ↑AcBc. Moreover AcBc is good which means ,AcBc.
5 Conclusion
Since AcBc is good and divergent, AcBc is an escalation. Hence we proved formally the
claim of the introduction, namely if agents assume that resource are infinite, escalation
is rational.
In the current implementation, the type of choices is the same for all the agents.
However, one may imagine that this type may depend on the agents. Making the type of
choices depending on the agents is object of the current investigation.
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